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11 Taxation of Income from 
Foreign Capital in Korea 
Kun-Young Yun 
11.1 Introduction 
1 1 . 1 . 1  Foreign Capital and the Economic Growth of Korea 
During the past three decades, foreign capital played an important role in 
the economic development of Korea. In particular, in the 1970s, when the 
government placed a high priority on the development of heavy and chemical 
industries, foreign capital was essential in financing major investment proj- 
ects. Table 1 1 . 1  shows that, in 1975, foreign savings financed as much as 
22.0% of total national investment. However, with economic growth the na- 
tional savings rate increased and the gap between national savings and invest- 
ment began to close. By 1986, national savings were more than sufficient to 
finance national investment. As a result, the importance of foreign savings in 
financing national investment diminished. In 1989, foreign savings supported 
less than 3% of national investment. 
Even though the inflow of foreign capital was essential for the rapid growth 
of the Korean economy, the government was careful not to attract too much 
foreign capital in the form of equity. Most of the foreign capital was either 
government borrowings or government-guaranteed commercial loans. For- 
eigners were not allowed to participate directly in the capital market, and for- 
eign direct investment accounted for a very small fraction of total foreign 
capital in Korea. 
With the decline in the importance of foreign capital as a source of national 
investment financing, the composition of foreign capital inflow changed sub- 
stantially. In the late 1970s, when the government was emphasizing invest- 
Kun-Young Yun is an associate professor of economics at Yonsei University, Seoul. 
The author has benefited from comments by Toshihiro Ihori, Takatoshi Ito, Charles McLure, 
Assaf Razin, Toshiaki Tachibanaki, John Whalley, and other conference participants. He is also 
grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 
Table 11.1 Foreign Capital and Economic Growth (in millions of U.S. dollars, %) 
Foreign Savings 
National National Government Commercial 
GNP Investment Savings Borrowings Loans FDI D + E + F 
Year (A) (B) (C) (Dl (E) (F) (G) BIA CIA GIA GIB 
1972 10,890 
1973 13,501 
1974 17,237 
1975 20,941 
1976 28,745 
1977 36,790 
1978 49,590 
1979 63,640 
1980 59,278 
1981 66,933 
1982 72,010 
1983 80,096 
1984 86,544 
1985 91,113 
1986 103,760 
1987 128,748 
1988 171,684 
1989 210,107 
2,337 
3,460 
5,579 
6,122 
7,802 
10,677 
16,656 
23,323 
19,492 
20,612 
21,605 
23,939 
26,811 
27,738 
30,504 
39,187 
53,531 
73,653 
1,903 
3,097 
3,552 
3,854 
7,130 
10,365 
15,146 
18,447 
14,037 
15,690 
18,025 
22,506 
25,927 
26,880 
34,462 
47,413 
66,199 
76,496 
- 
- 
317 
482 
711 
638 
817 
1,089 
1,516 
1,689 
1,868 
1,493 
1,424 
1,024 
880 
1,109 
891 
475 
- 
- 
616 
805 
843 
1,241 
1,913 
1,578 
1,402 
1,247 
913 
973 
858 
964 
1,620 
1,558 
988 
859 
- 
- 
124 
62 
86 
102 
100 
126 
96 
105 
128 
122 
193 
236 
976 
625 
894 
812 
- 
- 
1,057 
1,349 
1.640 
1,981 
2,830 
2,793 
3,014 
3,041 
2,909 
2,588 
2,475 
2,224 
3,476 
3,292 
2,773 
2,146 
21.4 17.5 - - 
25.6 22.9 - - 
32.2 20.6 6.1 18.9 
29.1 18.4 6.4 22.0 
27.1 24.8 5.7 21.0 
28.9 28.2 5.4 18.6 
33.5 30.5 5.7 17.0 
36.6 29.0 4.4 12.0 
32.8 23.7 5.1 15.5 
30.7 24.4 4.5 14.8 
29.8 25.0 4.0 13.5 
29.7 28.1 3.2 10.8 
30.9 30.0 2.9 9.2 
30.3 29.5 2.4 8.0 
29.2 33.2 3.4 11.4 
30.1 36.8 2.6 8.4 
31.0 38.6 1.6 5.2 
34.8 36.4 1.0 2.9 
Sources: Bank of Korea. Economic Statistics Yearbook (various issues), and National Accounts ( 1989); 
Ministry of Finance, Fiscal and Financial Statistics (various issues). 
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment in Korea. 
ment in heavy and chemical industries, foreign borrowings accounted for 
most of the capital inflow. During the 1980s, however, the share of foreign 
borrowings in total capital inflow declined, while that of foreign direct invest- 
ment increased. 
11.1.2 
Since 1981, Korea has been pursuing internationalization of its capital mar- 
ket, although the process has been slow. As of 1990, foreigners are not al- 
lowed to participate in the Korean capital market directly. Foreign portfolio 
investors can participate only through indirect channels such as investment 
funds for foreigners' and convertible bonds issued overseas. However, most 
of the restrictions on foreigners' participation in the capital market will be 
removed in the next few years. 
In December 1988, the government put forward a long-term plan for the 
internationalization of the capital market. According to this plan, foreign se- 
curities companies will be allowed to open branch offices in Korea by 199 1. 
They will also be allowed to join Korean companies in establishing new se- 
Internationalization of the Capital Market 
1. Investment funds for foreigners include investment trusts (beneficiaries certificates since 
1981), Korea Fund (1984), and Korea Europe Fund (1987). 
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curities companies. By 1992, foreigners will be able to participate directly in 
the Korean stock market. 
While working on the internationalization of the domestic capital market, 
the government has allowed Korean financial investors to participate in the 
world capital market. Since 1988, Korean financial investors such as securi- 
ties companies, insurance companies, investment trusts, etc., were allowed to 
invest in foreign securities. Beginning in 1991, Korean securities companies 
will also be allowed to open branch offices and establish subsidiaries abroad. 
As the Korean capital market matures and its participants become more 
experienced, the government will be able to pursue more aggressive policies 
for the internationalization of the capital market. At the same time, it will also 
encourage Korean investors, securities companies, and other financial insti- 
tutions to participate actively in the world capital market. 
Opening the capital market directly to foreign portfolio investors will affect 
the composition as well as the level of foreign capital inflow. It will also affect 
investment financing of the firms by allowing them to choose from a richer 
menu of financial instruments in a larger capital market. Perhaps even more 
important is that internationalization of the capital market will change the way 
savings and investment respond to tax policies, and other economic policies. 
For example, it may affect the optimal size of the tax burden on capital. 
Furthermore, the relative tax burden on corporate and individual capital in- 
come may affect national savings and investment. 
In light of these tax-policy implications, opening of the capital market re- 
quires a careful reexamination of the tax treatment of capital income. In order 
to derive practical tax-policy implications of the opening of the capital mar- 
ket, we need a comprehensive model of the tax system as well as information 
on the behavioral response of the savers and investors to tax policy. The pur- 
pose of this paper, however, is a modest one. I focus on the narrow issue of 
the taxation of income from foreign capital in Korea. In particular, I describe 
Korean tax policies pertaining to income from foreign capital in Korea and 
estimate the effective tax rate of investment financed with foreign capital. 
In section 11.2, I describe the tax treatment of income from foreign capital 
in Korea, in particular, the provisions of the tax laws, tax treaties, and the 
Foreign Capital Inducement Law. In section 11.3, I first estimate the effective 
rate of the corporate income tax for investments financed with foreign capital. 
I then consider the comprehensive effective tax rate, taking account of both 
the corporate and the nonresident withholding taxes on interest and dividends. 
In section 11.4, I consider some implications of my findings for tax policy. 
11.2 Tax Tk-eatment of Income from Foreign Capital 
1 1.2.1 The Individual and the Corporate Income Tax Laws 
The Individual Income Tax Law and the Corporate Income Tax Law pro- 
vide the basic framework of tax policy pertaining to income from foreign cap- 
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ital in Korea. According to these laws, income from foreign capital is either 
taxed on a global basis or taxed separately by income category, depending on 
the tax status of the taxpayer. 
Nonresident Taxpayer 
If a taxpayer has permanent establishments* or draws income from real es- 
tate in Korea,3 all of the taxpayer’s income originating within Korea, with the 
exception of capital gains on land and buildings, pension and retirement in- 
come, and timber income, are lumped together in a single category of global 
income. Global income so defined is then taxed in accordance with a progres- 
sive rate schedule. For taxpayers without a permanent establishment or real 
estate income, each category of income is taxed separately. Capital gains on 
land and buildings, pension and retirement income, and timber income are 
taxed separately for all taxpayers regardless of the existence of permanent 
establishments or real estate income. 
The marginal tax rate for global income is graduated from 5 to 50%. For 
retirement income and timber income, the rate schedule is the same as that 
which applies to global income. The tax rate for capital gains on land and 
buildings is also graduated, but the marginal tax rates are much higher, rang- 
ing from 40 to 60%. The taxation of nonresidents without a permanent estab- 
lishment or real estate income distinguishes three categories of capital income 
with the following withholding tax rates: 
1. Business income and rental income from vessels, airplanes, motor ve- 
2 .  Interest, dividends, and royalties: 25%. 
3. Capital gains on securities: 10% on transaction or 25% on capital gains, 
hicles, heavy machinery, and equipment: 2%. 
whichever is smaller. 
Corporations 
If a foreign corporation has either a permanent establishment, real estate 
income (including capital gains on land and buildings), or timber income, it 
is taxed like a resident corporation. The tax rate for corporate income is 20%, 
for the first 80 million won of the adjusted taxable income and 30% for the 
remainder. For other foreign corporations, income taxes are withheld at the 
source, with the tax rates the same as those for nonresident individuals. 
11.2.2 Defense Tax and Inhabitant Tax 
In addition to the income tax, the defense and inhabitant taxes are levied on 
individuals and corporations. The tax base of the defense and inhabitant taxes 
2. “Permanent establishment” includes branch offices, business offices, stores and other fixed 
sales places, factories, warehouses, construction sites, places for installation or assembly work, 
places for direction or supervision, places for provision of technological services, mines, quarries, 
and places for exploration or gathering of natural resources. 
3. “Real estate income” includes rental income, income from operation of real properties, 
capital gains on real estate other than land and buildings, and capital gains on property rights such 
as the right for mining, oil exploration, and quarrying. 
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is the income tax liability of individuals and corporations. The defense tax is 
levied on individuals and corporations with real estate income other than cap- 
ital gains on land and buildings or with permanent establishments. For indi- 
viduals, the tax rate is 10% if the total adjusted taxable income is not more 
than 8.4 million won per year, and 20% otherwise. For corporations, the tax 
rate is 20% if the adjusted taxable income is not more than 500 million won 
per year, and 25% otherwise. The inhabitant tax rate is 7.5% for both individ- 
uals and corporations. 
11.2.3 Foreign Capital Inducement Law 
As amended extensively in 1983, the principal objective of the Foreign 
Capital Inducement Law is to protect and provide incentives for foreign capi- 
tal inflow. The law places special emphasis on those foreign direct investments 
that contribute to the development of the Korean economy and help improve 
the balance of payments. Specifically, the law provides generous tax incen- 
tives for foreign direct investments in the following areas: 
1. Investments with substantial contributions to the improvement of balance 
2. Investment projects that employ advanced technologies or require a large 
3. Investments by overseas Korean residents. 
4. Investments by firms in the export free zones. 
5. Other foreign direct investments that require tax incentives. 
Tax incentives for foreign direct investment include a five-year tax holiday 
for individual business income, corporate income, and royalties; accelerated 
depreciation; exemption from the acquisition tax, property tax, and global 
land tax; reduction of import duties, special excise tax, and value-added 
tax (VAT). 
Specifically, eligible foreign direct investors can take either the 100% spe- 
cial depreciation, which doubles the speed of tax depreciation, or the tax hol- 
iday for corporate income and dividends for any five consecutive years within 
the first ten taxable years after the registration of the business. Since the tax- 
payer decides when to take the five-year tax holiday within the first ten taxable 
years, with appropriate tax planning the taxpayer may be able to reduce his or 
her tax burden substantially for the first ten taxable years. 
The acquisition tax, property tax, and global land tax are exempt for the 
first five years after the registration of the business. Similarly, royalties based 
on the agreement for technology transfer, as reported to the minister of fi- 
nance, are tax exempt for the first five years after the agreement is reported. 
Finally, import duties, special excise tax, and VAT are reduced by 70% for 
capital goods that are imported as an equity investment of the foreign investor. 
The same tax preferences are extended to the import of capital goods if they 
are paid for with dividends received by the foreign investor or with foreign 
currency paid in by the foreign investor. 
In addition to the tax preferences for foreign direct investment in Korea, the 
of payments. 
amount of capital. 
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Foreign Capital Inducement Law provides tax exemptions for interest on gov- 
ernment borrowing and commercial loans. The law provides a variety of tax 
incentives for foreign direct investment, but tax exemption of interest income 
is the only incentive for foreign borrowing. Since the value of outstanding 
foreign borrowing is much larger than that of foreign direct investment, how- 
ever, tax exemption of interest income has been a crucial element of tax policy 
for income from foreign capital. 
11.2.4 Tax Treaties 
As of January 1, 1990, Korea has concluded tax treaties with twenty-eight 
countries, including Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Canada, France, Australia, Sweden, Norway, Thailand, and Indonesia. In all 
of the tax treaties, the maximum withholding tax rates for interest, dividends, 
and royalties are in the 10-15% range, which is substantially lower than the 
corresponding tax rates for domestically owned capital income. It is also true 
that the withholding tax rates are lower than the regular income tax rates in 
the home country of the capital. This feature of the tax treaties reflects a com- 
promise between the host and the home countries that collect taxes from the 
same source. 
The Individual Income Tax Law and the Corporate Income Tax Law also 
define the nonresident withholding tax rates. For dividends, interest, and roy- 
alties, the withholding tax rate as defined by the domestic laws is 25%, which 
is higher than the maximum withholding rates allowed under the tax treaties. 
Since virtually all of the foreign capital in Korea is covered by the tax treaties, 
the nonresident withholding tax rates for dividends, interest, and royalties are 
determined by the tax treaties, and the provisions of the domestic tax laws that 
define the withholding tax rates for these categories of income are practically 
meaningless. 
11.2.5 Tax Revenues 
Table 1 1.2 presents statistics on tax collections from foreign corporations 
with permanent establishments in Korea. It is evident from the table that the 
Table 11.2 Taxation of Foreign Corporations with Permanent Establishment or 
Real Estate Income 
Total Tax 
Number of Income Revenue Average 
Year Corporations (billion won) (billion won) Tax Rate (a) 
1985 353 204.5 52.5 25.6 
1986 408 163.6 44.7 27.3 
1987 457 207.4 57.3 27.6 
1988 609 244.9 69.1 28.2 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
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number of foreign corporations investing in Korea has been steadily increas- 
ing in recent years along with the total income generated by them and the total 
amount of tax paid. Note that the average tax rate faced by the foreign corpo- 
rations shows a slightly rising trend, which may be attributed to the gradua- 
tion of the tax rate and the lack of indexation of the tax brackets. 
Table 1 1.3 presents similar information on tax collections from the taxpay- 
ers without permanent establishments. Of total income, royalties account for 
the largest share and the remainder is accounted for by business and real estate 
income, dividends, and interest i n ~ o m e . ~  Table 11.3 also shows that business 
and real estate incomes are the most favored by the tax policy. The average tax 
rate for business and real estate incomes has been only 2.0% as opposed to 
7.6-25.0% for other categories of income. Until 1987, royalties and interest 
were taxed more heavily than dividends, but in 1988 the differences among 
the average tax rates of royalties, dividends, and interest narrowed substan- 
tially. 
11.3 Effective Tax Rate of Foreign Investment 
1 1.3.1 Effective Tax Rate and the Cost of Capital 
The taxation of corporate income or personal business income is compli- 
cated due to the difficulties of measuring taxable income, differential tax treat- 
ment of debt and equity, and the various provisions for tax incentives. Because 
of the complexity of the capital income tax system, it is practically impossible 
to figure out from the tax laws the tax burden imposed on investment. 
If the taxation of income from domestically owned and operated capital is 
complicated, even more complicated is the taxation of income from foreign 
capital. For foreign capital, the home country also levies taxes on foreign 
investment income after the host country has taken its share. For example, in 
the case of foreign corporate investment, the host country levies corporate 
income taxes and nonresident withholding taxes on dividends, interest, roy- 
alties, etc. The home country then levies its own corporate and individual 
income taxes. 
For a reliable analysis of the effect of taxation on foreign investment, it is 
convenient to have a summary measure of the overall tax burden on invest- 
ment. One such measure is the effective tax rate on investment. The effective 
tax rate condenses the effects of various provisions of the tax laws and the 
behavior of the taxpayers into a single number that represents the total tax 
burden on investment. In this section, I discuss the effective tax rate of cor- 
porate investment that is financed with foreign capital. 
4. The fact that royalties account for the largest share of capital income may be related to the 
fact that, like interest payments, royalties are deductible for corporate income tax purposes and 
that royalties are eligible for tax preferences that are similar to those applicable to dividends. 
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Table 11.3 Taxation of Foreign Taxpayers without Permanent Establishment: 
Individuals and Corporations (billion won) 
Spe  of 
Income 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Business and real estate 
Income 17.84 17.72 15.43 40.46 82.08 
Tax revenue 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.81 1.63 
ATR (%) 2.00 2.02 2.00 2.00 1.98 
Income 8.60 3.03 3.98 3.07 7.21 
Tax revenue 2.15 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.95 
ATR (%) 25.00 13.88 12.22 15.71 13.11 
Income 9.41 29.79 51.68 39.85 40.75 
Tax revenue 1.38 3.41 3.90 3.91 5.64 
ATR (%) 14.70 11.45 7.55 9.82 13.85 
Income 20.36 48.38 58.30 95.34 109.81 
Tax revenue 3.60 6.30 7.84 11.57 17.37 
ATR (%) 17.69 13.02 13.45 12.13 15.82 
Income 13.02 10.59 1 1.05 13.69 20.42 
Tax revenue 2.60 2.10 2.16 1.97 3.88 
ATR (%) 19.96 17.79 19.58 14.42 19.01 
Income 8.07 2.84 4.32 3.21 17.41 
Tax revenue 1.68 0.71 1.08 0.56 2.04 
ATR (%) 20.78 25.00 24.95 17.37 11.72 
Income 77.29 112.36 144.76 195.61 277.67 
Tax revenue 11.77 13.30 15.78 19.30 31.51 
ATR (%) 15.22 11.83 10.90 9.87 11.34 
Interest 
Dividends 
Royalties 
Human services 
Other 
Total 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
Note: ATR = average tax rate. 
We start with the effective corporate tax rate on investment, which is de- 
fined by 
(1 - E J F ,  = rc 
where E ,  is the effective corporate income tax rate, F ,  is the marginal produc- 
tivity of capital net of depreciation, and rc is the corporate after-tax rate of 
return on investment. Eq. (1) may be rewritten as 
E,F ,  = F ,  - r,, 
Eq. (2) implies that the effective burden of income tax on one unit of invest- 
ment is equal to E ,  F,, which is the difference between the marginal produc- 
tivity of capital (or the social rate of return) and the after-tax rate of return. 
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Eq. (1) or (2) can be modified to define other effective tax rates on invest- 
ment. In particular, we can define a comprehensive effective tax rate that en- 
compasses both the corporate and the withholding taxes by 
(1 - E , )  F ,  = rp .  
where E ,  is the comprehensive effective tax rate and r p  is the rate of return on 
investment after the corporate and withholding taxes. 
In order to measure the effective tax rate, we need to know the marginal 
productivity of capital and the after-tax rate of return on investment. Measur- 
ing the latter is relatively straightforward. However, it is difficult, if not im- 
possible, to obtain a direct measure of the marginal productivity of capital. 
Thus we assume that the producer is in equilibrium in the sense that the cost 
of capital is equalized to the marginal productivity of capital. 
11.3.2 Financial Behavior of the Firm 
In measuring the effective tax rate on investment, we need to be specific 
about the assumptions concerning dividend behavior and capital structure of 
the firm. There are two competing views on the dividend behavior of a firm. 
One is the so-called traditional view that implies that firms pay out a fixed 
fraction of the after-tax profits. Under this view, the marginal source of equity 
finance is new share issues. The alternative view, which is known as the new 
view or the trapped equity view, implies that the firm adjusts dividend pay- 
ments according to the need for investment funds. Under this view, the mar- 
ginal source of equity finance is retention of profits. It may be noted that the 
traditional view does not rule out retention; neither does the new view pre- 
clude new share issues altogether. The two competing views differ in the way 
in which marginal equity funds are raised. 
In reality, the marginal source of equity finance can be either new share 
issues or retention, depending on the firm's financial condition. For a new or 
a fast-growing firm, the marginal source of equity finance is likely to be new 
share issues. In contrast, a mature firm with stable cash flow may choose 
retention, which is the cheaper method of equity finance. It is difficult to iden- 
tify the pattern of financial behavior of individual firms however, or even to 
determine the proportion of the firms that can be classified under either view 
of dividend behavior. 
Under the traditional view, the marginal withholding tax rate on equity in- 
come is a weighted average of the withholding tax rates for dividend and cap- 
ital gains. Under the new view, the marginal withholding tax rate is the with- 
holding tax rate on capital gains. In this paper, I take the traditional view. 
Since the withholding tax rates for dividend and capital gains are similar, 
however, the results are not sensitive to the assumption on dividend behavior 
(see section 11.3.4). 
Regarding the capital structure of the firm, we assume that the firm has a 
maximum debt capacity and takes advantage of the tax deduction of interest 
302 Kun-Young Yun 
payment by maintaining the debucapital ratio at the maximum level, where 
“capital” refers to the total value of debt and equity claims on the firm. It 
follows that the firm borrows a fixed fraction of the investment funds and 
raises the remainder by issuing new shares and/or retaining profits. 
11.3.3 Effective Corporate Tax Rates 
Under the above assumptions about the firm’s financial behavior, maximi- 
zation of the shareholder’s wealth yields the following expression for the cost 
of capital:’ 
1 - k - t,(z + y) 
F , + 6 =  [R + 61 + t , ,  1 - t ,  (3) 
where 
(4) R = (1 - P)re + p[(1 - t,)i - I T ] .  
The notations in (3) and (4) are 6 = rate of economic depreciation; k = rate 
of investment tax credit; z = present value of tax depreciation; y = present 
value of tax deduction due to the tax deferral of investment reserve; p = debt/ 
capital ratio, or debt/(debt + equity) ratio; tc  = corporate income tax rate; t ,  
= property tax rate; re = corporate after-tax rate of return on equity; i = 
nominal interest rate; and IT = rate of inflation. 
In order to determine the cost of capital for corporate investment, we allo- 
cate the after-tax rate of return on corporate capital, as reported in the corpo- 
rate income statement, between the returns to debt and equity. Within the ac- 
counting framework of corporate income statement, the real return to debt is 
yi - pn, where y is the ratio of interest-bearing debucapital ratio. The re- 
mainder of the after-tax rate of return is allocated to equity according to 
( 5 )  
where r,,, is the after-tax rate of return reported in the income statement. 
It is clear from ( 5 )  that r ,  is smaller than the real after-tax rate of return on 
corporate capital by the amount of implicit interest on the non-interest-bearing 
debts. We assume that the implicit interest on non-interest-bearing debts is the 
same as that on interest-bearing debt, and add the implicit interest on both 
sides of (5). The result is 
( 5 ‘ )  r,,, + (p - y)i = (1  - P)rY + p(i - IT) 
We refer to the right-hand side of (5‘) as the real after-tax rate of return on 
corporate capital and denote it by rc .  Thus 
(6) 
rnP = (1  - @)re + yi - PIT, 
rc = (1 - P)re + p(i - IT). 
5 .  See Jorgenson and Yun (1991) for derivation 
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In the calculation of the cost of capital, we set the debthapita1 ratio and the 
nominal interest rate of corporate debt at their 1977-86 averages in the man- 
ufacturing sector, i.e., p = 0.79 and i = 14.7%, respectively. In order to 
establish a point of reference for the calculation of the various rates of return 
and the effective tax rates, we hold the real after-tax rate of return on corporate 
capital, before adjustment for the implicit interest on non-interest-bearing 
debts, at its 1977-86 average, that is, rnP = 8.4%. 
Eqs. (5) and (6) are used to calculate the real after-tax rate of return on 
equity, re ,  and the after-tax rate of return on corporate capital (debt + equity), 
rc .  The nominal interest rate on corporate debt is held constant to reflect the 
insensitivity of nominal interest rate with respect to the rate of inflation.6 
The corporate tax rate, t , ,  is calibrated to reflect the effects of the defense 
tax and the inhabitant tax as well as corporate income tax. Specifically, t ,  is 
set equal to the statutory tax rate for corporate income multiplied by 1.325, 
reflecting that the defense and inhabitant taxes are 25% and 7.5%, respec- 
tively, of the corporate income tax. Using the statutory corporate tax rate of 
30%, we set t ,  at 39.75%. 
We do not have any estimates of the economic depreciation rates of capital 
assets employed in Korea. We take the economic depreciation rates of the 
various categories of assets estimated by Hulten and Wykoff (1981) for the 
United States, then calculate the weighted averages for machinery and equip- 
ment and for buildings and structures. The shares of each category of assets 
in the net national capital stock from the National Wealth Survey of Korea 
(Economic Planning Board 1977) are used as the weights. We obtain 
6 = 13.07% for machinery and equipment, and 6 = 3.3% for buildings and 
structures. 
For tax depreciation, the taxpayer can choose either the straightline method 
or the declining balance method. Under the current law, the depreciation rate 
for the declining balance method is calibrated so that 10% of the capital cost 
remains undepreciated after the tax life of an asset. Since the declining bal- 
ance method results in a larger present value for the tax deduction, we assume 
that the taxpayer chooses the declining balance method. Using the same 
weights used in the economic depreciation calculation, we estimate the depre- 
ciation rate for tax purposes to be 21.69% for machinery and equipment and 
5.9% for buildings and structures. 
Once the cost of capital, which is equated to the marginal productivity of 
capital, and the after-tax rate of return are calculated, the effective corporate 
tax rate can be estimated according to 
6 .  With the nominal interest rate constant, holding rV constant is equivalent to holding rc con- 
stant. To see this, subtract (5) from (6)  and rearrange the terms to obtain 
rc = r P  + (p - y) i .  
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(7) 
I considered eight tax incentives and calculated the effective corporate tax 
rates under each of them. To provide a reference of comparison, I also calcu- 
lated the effective tax without any tax preference. In order to test for sensitiv- 
ity, I repeated the calculations for three different rates of inflation. Table 11.4 
presents the estimated effective corporate tax rates for machinery and equip- 
ment (see the three rows with E c ) .  Similarly, table 11.5 presents the effective 
tax rates for buildings and structures. 
The effective corporate tax rates are negative in all the cases considered 
both for machinery and equipment and for buildings and structures. In partic- 
ular, the effective tax rates have large absolute values when a generous tax 
preference, such as 100% special depreciation, 50% expensing, 10% invest- 
ment tax credit, or 15% investment reserve, is available. It follows that the 
corporate income tax in Korea effectively serves as an incentive system for 
investment. 
It should be emphasized that the effective tax rates in table 11.4 and 11.5 
are estimated under the assumption that the firm is eligible for at most one 
category of incentives for a given investment. The tax laws indeed have pro- 
visions that prohibit taxpayers from taking more than one tax preference for 
the same activity. In practice, however, there are cases in which firms are 
eligible for more than one tax preference. For example, a firm that finances an 
investment project with the funds from investment reserve may be eligible for 
investment tax credit, expensing, or special depreciation for the same project. 
In such a case, the effective tax rate must be lower than tables 11.4 and 11.5 
indicate. 
Since nominal interest payments are deductible, the effective corporate tax 
rate decreases with the rate of inflation. The real after-tax rate of return on 
equity, re ,  is very sensitive to the rate of inflation. In particular, re is as high 
as 44.7% when the rate of inflation is 10% per year. Underlying these phe- 
nomena are the high debtkapital ratio in the firms’ capital structure and the 
insensitivity of nominal interest to inflation. 
In interpreting the estimated effective tax rates, two caveats are in order. 
First, my estimate of the debticapital ratio is likely to be an overestimate of 
the true value because my figures are based on book values, rather than the 
replacement cost, of the corporate assets. Since interest payments are tax de- 
ductible while dividend payments are not, to the extent the debtkapital ratio 
is overestimated, the effective tax rate is underestimated. Second, my esti- 
mates of the economic depreciation rates are also problematic. One may easily 
argue that the economic depreciation rates of the assets in Korea are higher 
than those in the United States. Unfortunately I do not have any solid evidence 
as to the direction and magnitude of the biases in my calculation. 
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Table 11.4 Effective Tax Rate: Machinery and Equipment (%) 
Special Investment Investment 
Depreciation Expensing Tax Credit Reserve 
No 
1T Incentives 30 50 100 30 50 3.0 10.0 15.0 
0.0 
‘k 12.1 11.5 11.2 10.7 11.0 10.2 11.1 8.7 9.5 
E,  -8.0 -13.9 -17.0 -22.6 -19.2 -28.3 -17.0 -49.9 -37.3 
E. 5.2 0.3 -2.4 -7.2 -4.2 -12.4 -3.3 -31.8 -20.7 
rc = 13.1 r, = 7.1 rp = 11.5 
6.0 
‘k 11.9 11.3 11.0 10.4 10.8 10.0 10.9 8.5 9.3 
E, -10.4 -16.5 -19.6 -25.4 -21.9 -31.4 -20.6 -53.8 -40.8 
E, 9.9 5.1 2.5 -3.1 0.7 -7.2 1.6 -26.1 -15.3 
re = 29.7 rp = 10.7 r, = 13.1 
Fk 11.7 11.1 10.8 10.3 10.6 9.8 10.7 8.4 9.2 
10.0 
E, -12.0 -18.2 -21.5 -27.4 -23.8 -33.5 -22.5 -56.6 -43.1 
E,  12.7 8.0 5.4 0.8 3.7 -4.2 4.6 -21.6 -11.0 
rD = 10.2 rc = 13.1 r, = 44.7 
Paramerers: 6 = 13.07, d = 21.69, a = 34.0, p = 79.0, y = 47.0, i = 14.7, ic = 18.0, rv = 
8.4, rt = 39.75, rd = rg = r, = 12.5, tp = 0.0 
Notes: 71 = rate of inflation; Fk = marginal productivity of capital, net of depreciation; E, = effec- 
tive corporate tax rate; E, = comprehensive effective tax rate, corporate and withholding taxes; rc = 
real rate of return on capital (equity + debt), after corporate tax; r, = real rate of return on equity, 
after corporate tax; rp = real rate of return on capital (equity + debt), after corporate and withholding 
taxes. 6 = rate of economic depreciation; d = rate of tax depreciation; a = dividence payout ratio; 
p = debucapital ratio, where capital = debt + equity; y = interest bearing debUcapita1 ratio; i = 
nominal interest rate on corporate debt; i‘ = present value of income deduction for new share issue; 
rrlp = after-tax rate of return on corporate capital as reported in income statement; f = corporate 
income tax rate; r, = withholding tax rate on dividend; r8 withholding tax rate on capital gains, 
accrual based; t, = withholding tax rate on interest income; rp = property tax rate. 
1 1.3.4 Comprehensive Effective Tax Rate 
I have estimated the effective corporate tax rate of investment. From a for- 
eign investor’s point of view, however, a more comprehensive measure of ef- 
fective tax burden would be desirable, possibly encompassing all the taxes 
levied by the host and the home countries. Incorporating the home country 
taxes in my measure of effective tax rate is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead I estimate the effective burden of all the income taxes imposed in 
Korea. 
The real rate of return on corporate capital after withholding taxes is a 
weighted average of the returns to equity and debt, both after withholding 
taxes, i.e., 
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Table 11.5 Effective Tax Rate: Buildings and Structures (a) 
Special Investment Investment 
Depreciation Expensing Tax Credit Reserve 
No 
71 Incentives 30 50 100 30 50 3.0 10.0 15.0 
0.0 
Fk 12.8 12.3 12.0 11.4 11.5 10.6 12.2 10.9 9.9 
Ec -2.6 -6.9 -9.4 -14.7 -14.3 -23.8 -7.2 -19.9 -33.0 
E,  10.4 6.8 4.4 -0.6 0.3 -8.2 6.0 -5.2 -15.8 
re = 7.1 rp = 11.5 rc = 13.1 
Fk 12.5 12.0 11.7 11.2 11.2 10.3 11.9 10.7 9.6 
6.0 
E,  -5.0 -9.5 -12.1 -17.5 -17.1 -27.0 -9.8 -22.9 -36.4 
E, 14.2 10.7 8.4 4.3 4.3 -4.1 9.9 -0.2 -11.7 
re = 29.7 r,, = 10.7 rc = 13.1 
10.0 
Fk 12.3 11.8 11.5 11.0 11.0 10.2 11.7 10.5 9.4 
Ec -6.8 -11.3 -14.0 -19.5 -19.1 -29.1 -11.6 -24.9 -38.8 
Fo 17.0 13.5 11.2 7.2 7.2 -0.1 12.7 2.7 -8.6 
rc = 44.7 rp = 10.2 rc = 13.1 
Notes: Parameters: 6 = 3.3, d = 5.9. For other parameters and notes, see table 11.4. 
(8) r p  = (1 - P)(r - IT) + P[(1 - ti)i - IT ] ,  
where rp is the real rate of return to corporate capital after the withholding 
taxes, r is the nominal rate of return on equity after withholding tax, and t i  is 
the marginal withholding tax rate on interest income. Notice that the expres- 
sion in the brackets represents the real rate of return to debt, after withhold- 
ing tax. 
In order to measure the comprehensive effective tax rate we need to calcu- 
late rp .  For this purpose we need to distinguish the sources of equity finance. 
Under the traditional view, the marginal source of equity finance is new share 
issues and the relevant marginal withholding tax rate for equity income is a 
weighted average of the withholding tax rates on dividends and capital gains. 
Under the new view, the marginal source is retention and the corresponding 
marginal tax rate is the withholding tax rate on capital gains. 
Specifically, under the traditional view 
(9) 
r - IT(I - r l )  
1 - (at ,  + (1 - a)t,)’ re = 
where t ,  and t ,  are the marginal withholding tax rates on dividend and capital 
gains, respectively. Under the new view, 
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(9') 
r - ~ ( l  - t R )  
re = ~ 
1 - t ,  . 
Making use of (1 '), (8), and (9) or (9'), we can calculate the comprehensive 
effective tax rate on corporate investment, encompassing both the corporate 
and withholding taxes. 
In the above discussion, the tax rate for capital gains is accrual based. In 
practice, however, capital gains are taxed on a realization basis, and the stat- 
utory tax rate on capital gains is defined accordingly. Thus we need to convert 
the realization-based tax rate into an accrual-based one. A rule of thumb for 
the conversion is to cut the realization-based tax rate by one-half to obtain an 
accrual-based tax rate. This is roughly equivalent to assuming that the holding 
period of equity is ten years and the appropriate discount rate is 7% per year. 
Since the statutory withholding tax rate is 25% on realized capital gains, it 
is reasonable to assume that the accrual-based withholding tax rate is in the 
range of 10-15%, which is the same as the range of withholding tax rates on 
dividend and interest incomes. In estimating the comprehensive effective tax 
rate, we set the withholding tax rates on dividends, interest, and accrued cap- 
ital gains at 12.5%, i.e., t ,  = t ,  = t, = 12.5%. With the withholding tax 
rates the same for dividends and capital gains, the comprehensive effective tax 
rates are the same under either view of dividend behavior. 
The estimated effective tax rates are reported in tables 1 1.4 and 1 1.5. Since 
all the withholding tax rates are set at 12.5%, the comprehensive effective tax 
rates are substantially higher than the corresponding effective corporate tax 
rates. In particular, the comprehensive effective tax rates are substantially 
closer to zero than the effective corporate tax rates. In the central case of 6% 
inflation, the comprehensive effective tax rates are between - 26.1 and 9.9% 
for machinery and equipment and between - 11.7 and 14.2% for buildings 
and structures. 
Since nominal interest and nominal capital gains are taxed at the withhold- 
ing level, the differences between the effective corporate tax rates and the cor- 
responding comprehensive effective tax rates increase with inflation. The 
value of interest deduction at the corporate level increases with inflation, 
while the tax burden increases with inflation at the withholding level. The 
comprehensive effective tax rates in tables 11.4 and 11.5 suggest that, on 
balance, tax burden increases with inflation. 
In the calculation of the comprehensive effective tax rates, we assumed that 
the government collects 12.5% of withholding tax on foreign capital income. 
Although this assumption provides a useful benchmark, it is not realistic. As 
I discussed in section 11.2, in accordance with the Foreign Capital Induce- 
ment Law, the government exempts most dividends and interest income from 
taxation. Since government borrobing and commercial loans are the principal 
forms of foreign capital in Korea, tax exemption of interest on foreign debt is 
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particularly important. For foreign direct investment, the firm can choose 
either the 100% special depreciation or the five-year tax holiday for corporate 
income and dividends. If these tax preferences are taken into account, the 
actual comprehensive effective tax rates must be similar to the effective cor- 
porate tax rates in tables 11.4 and 11.5. 
11.4 Policy Issues 
11.4.1 Are the Current Tax Preferences Excessive? 
A natural question at this point is whether Korea’s current tax treatment of 
income from foreign capital is appropriate. This question cannot be answered 
definitively without knowing the optimal effective tax rate. However, my anal- 
ysis suggests strongly that Korea’s tax policy is too generous for the income 
from foreign capital. In order to justify the current tax policy, we need a con- 
vincing argument such as that foreign capital generates large positive external 
effects. 
Many of Korea’s tax treaties with its trading partners include tax-sparing 
provisions for capital income. One implicit assumption underlying the tax- 
sparing provisions is that lowering the overall tax burden, including the tax 
burden of the home country, on foreign capital attracts more foreign capital 
into Korea. It may be true that the supply of foreign capital is indeed respon- 
sive to the after-tax rate of return. However, the fact that a tax-sparing provi- 
sion prevents the tax preference provided by the host country from being offset 
by home country taxes is not sufficient to justify the substantially negative 
effective tax rates. With the national savings rate well above 30% and higher 
than the national investment rate, it would be difficult to find convincing evi- 
dence in support of the current negative effective tax rates. 
If the current tax policy is excessively generous to foreign capital, what are 
the necessary policy changes? The most obvious approach is to eliminate the 
tax preferences for foreign capital. It is especially worth considering the abo- 
lition of the tax preferences provided by the Foreign Capital Inducement Law, 
such as the five-year tax holidays, 100% special depreciation, tax exemption 
of interest, reduction of special excise tax, exemption from property tax, etc. 
One of the main reasons the effective corporate tax rates are negative is that 
interest payments are deductible at the firm level while investments financed 
by debt are eligible for all the tax preferences that apply to equity-financed 
investment. Given the tax treatment of debt-financed investment at the firm 
level, the exemption of interest income from withholding tax guarantees a 
negative comprehensive effective tax rate for debt-financed investment. In this 
situation, the abolition of tax exemption for interest on foreign loans would 
be of particular importance. 
One might consider increasing the tax burden on foreign capital at the firm 
level. However, this approach is less attractive than eliminating the tax pref- 
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erences specific to foreign capital. Because of the nondiscrimination clauses 
of the tax treaties, increasing the tax burden on foreign capital at the firm level 
will increase the tax burden of domestically owned capital as well. If the over- 
all tax treatment of domestically owned capital is excessively generous, there 
are no difficulties. Otherwise, my analysis cannot be relied upon to justify 
such a policy. 
11.4.2 Internationalization of the Capital Market 
Foreign portfolio investors are not eligible for the tax preferences provided 
by the Foreign Capital Inducement Law. As a result, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the comprehensive effective tax rates on foreign portfolio invest- 
ments are close to those presented in tables 11.4 and 11.5. If 6% inflation is 
assumed, all of the comprehensive effective tax rates I consider for buildings 
and structures are not far from zero. A similar pattern is observed for machin- 
ery and equipment, with the exception of the cases with the 10% investment 
tax credit and 15% investment reserve. 
The above analysis suggests that the current framework of Korean tax pol- 
icy need not be modified in any fundamental way to accommodate intemation- 
alization of the capital market. The main tax policy issue appears to be in tax 
administration. For example, since the capital gains on financial assets owned 
by resident individuals are exempt from taxation, it might be difficult to tax 
effectively the capital gains on financial assets owned by foreign investors. 
The issue of tax administration becomes particularly serious because financial 
assets can be traded among residents under pseudonyms. 
The issue of taxing capital gains on financial assets has long been debated 
in Korea. Similarly, the abolition of financial transactions under pseudonyms 
has been on the government agenda for about a decade. At present, the con- 
sensus is that the capital gains should be taxed and financial transactions under 
pseudonyms should be abolished. With internationalization of the capital mar- 
ket, the issues of taxing capital gains on financial assets owned by nonresident 
individuals will become more important. Internationalization of the capital 
market adds new reasons for going forward with the reforms in tax policy on 
capital gains and the practice of financial transactions under pseudonyms. 
11.5 Conclusion 
I have described the tax treatment of income from foreign capital in Korea 
and estimated the effective tax rate of corporate investment financed with for- 
eign capital. The analysis of section 11.3 shows that the effective rates of 
corporate income tax are negative under realistic assumptions and that the 
absolute values of the effective tax rate are large when generous tax prefer- 
ences are available. Without further tax preferences, especially at the with- 
holding level, the comprehensive effective tax rates are not far from zero. 
With the tax exemption of interest and the five-year tax holidays for corporate 
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income and dividends, however, the comprehensive effective tax rates are neg- 
ative and close to the effective corporate tax rates. 
The overall tax preferences for foreign capital in Korea are excessive, and 
the tax preferences need to be curtailed. The obvious approach is to reduce or 
eliminate the most generous preferences, such as tax exemption of interest 
income, 100% special depreciation, and the five-year tax holidays for corpo- 
rate income and dividends. In addition to these changes in the income tax 
policy, the exemption of the acquisition tax, property tax, and global land tax 
and the reduction of the special excise tax, VAT, import duties, etc., may also 
be reconsidered. 
The basic framework of Korean tax policy need not be changed to accom- 
modate the internationalization of capital market. However, unless the capital 
gains on domestically owned financial assets are taxed and the practice of 
financial transactions under pseudonyms is abolished, it would be difficult to 
tax effectively the capital gains on financial assets owned by nonresident in- 
dividuals. In this sense, internationalization of the capital market has salutary 
effects on the development of the Korean economic system. 
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Comment Toshihiro Ihori 
Kun-Young Yun’s paper provides a framework for the analysis of the impact 
of taxation of income from foreign capital on a small capital-importing coun- 
try, Korea. In contrast with much of the earlier work in this area, an attempt 
is made to ground some of the equations on standard microtheory. I think the 
paper is useful in that it attempts to explain the Korean tax policy from 
the optimal taxation perspective. I have a few comments and questions for the 
author. 
This paper estimates the effective tax rate of corporate investment financed 
with foreign income. It would be useful to estimate the effective tax rate of 
corporate investment financed with domestic income as well. If the former tax 
rate is less than the latter, it would mean that the tax preferences for foreign 
capital in Korea are excessive. If both rates were almost the same, it would 
imply that Korea’s tax policy is not necessarily generous for the income from 
foreign capital. 
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It would be useful to discuss the normative aspects of tax policy on the 
whole capital income, domestic or foreign, in Korea. In order to stimulate 
economic growth, it might be necessary to reduce capital income taxes.’ If so, 
the generous treatment of foreign capital in Korea may be justified. 
Equation (3) assumes that foreign capital can move freely into Korea, so 
that the optimal marginal condition is satisfied. Is such an assumption realistic 
in Korea? Were there any restrictions on importing capital in the 1970s? 
International capital movements are crucially dependent on the tax system. 
In a territorial system capital income tax burdens depend on where the income 
is earned, but not on the consumer’s country of residence. Conversely, under 
a residence system, tax burdens depend on the country of residence, not on 
where income is earned. Hence, if the residence system is realistic, the gen- 
erous tax treatment of foreign capital in Korea may be offset by the tax treat- 
ment in the rest of the world, so that the supply of foreign capital may not be 
responsive to the after-tax rate of return. 
Overall, this is a very useful paper investigating taxation of income from 
foreign capital. I hope that the normative aspects of tax policy in Korea will 
be explored more fully in future research. 
Comment Toshiaki Tachibanaki 
The paper by Kun-Young Yun investigates the tax treatment of income from 
foreign capital in Korea and examines the effect of tax policy on capital inflow. 
The paper is a useful application of neoclassical economic theory, providing 
us with an interesting policy implication for Korea. My comments are con- 
cerned with an overview of foreign capital in Korea and the empirical results 
obtained in this paper. 
First, section 1 1.2 gives an overview of foreign capital in Korea. The paper 
does not show in detail what percentage of all capital is foreign. Moreover, it 
would be useful to describe from what countries capital is imported and in 
what form, say direct investment or financial investment. That information 
would be helpful to understand and judge the usefulness of the theoretical and 
empirical parts of the paper. 
Second, related to the first point, the utility of the maximization of the tax 
revenue from foreign capital is doubtful. If the share of the tax revenue from 
foreign capital in Korea were negligible, it would not be effective for the gov- 
ernment in Korea to use the maximization principle; other behavioral prin- 
ciples would be more useful. 
1. See, for example, R. J. Barro, “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous 
Toshiaki Tachibanaki is professor of economics at Kyoto University. 
Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 98: S103-25. 
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Third, the theory part neatly develops the neoclassical growth and tax 
model. Although several stringent assumptions are imposed, it would be un- 
fair to fault Yun for that. I am impressed with the Jorgensonian neoclassical 
approach throughout the paper. 
Fourth, it is quite impressive to see the negative effective tax rates for in- 
vestment in the empirical part. This implies a subsidy. The paper does not 
present in detail the reasons for the negative rates; it would be useful to have 
a decomposition analysis to draw some conjectures for rates, or a sensitivity 
analysis to confirm that the negative values are right. I would guess that the 
reasons are a very high debvequity ratio in Korea or generous depreciation 
allowances. These were quite effective for promoting high investment activity 
in postwar Japan and are supposed to be very effective in the process of indus- 
trialization. It is impressive to see that two countries, namely Korea and Ja- 
pan, had the common policy tools for strong industrialization. 
COrIlmeIlt Twatchai Yongkittikul 
Kun-Young Yun’s extremely well-organized paper formulates a very elaborate 
theoretical framework for an evaluation of the tax policy, and then painstak- 
ingly measures the effective tax rate in Korea. The empirical results are com- 
pared with the theoretical conclusions to draw the policy implications. I have 
just a few general comments. 
First, since the theoretical framework is quite elaborate, Yun inevitably 
discovered a considerable gap between the theoretical and the empirical data. 
He therefore found it necessary to make a number of assumptions in order to 
bridge this gap. He thus noted that his estimate of the effective tax rate was 
only as good as the assumptions made in the calculation. Since the policy 
implications were drawn from these empirical results, one could not help but 
wonder how sensitive these results were regarding the assumptions made. The 
readers might feel a bit more comfortable if some of these assumptions were 
varied to ascertain the sensitivity of the results. 
Second, Yun found that, although the overall tax burden levied by the Ko- 
rean government on foreign capital is reasonable, the extremely generous tax 
treatments provided by the Foreign Capital Inducement Law for foreign direct 
investment in Korea are not justified. In the presence of the foreign tax credit 
system in the home country, the tax exemption provided by the law merely 
benefits the treasury of the home country without affecting the effective tax 
burden of the investor. This conclusion is quite relevant for the small devel- 
oping countries that are competing with each other to attract foreign capital 
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Research Institute Foundation. 
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by providing excessively generous incentives. A better-coordinated tax policy 
among the developing countries in this regard would clearly increase their 
benefits from foreign investment. 
Third, this paper focused on taxes as the only policy instrument affecting 
capital flows. I believe that there are a number of factors that would encourage 
or discourage foreign capital, the major ones being interest rates and foreign 
exchange rates. These have been used extensively in many countries as policy 
instruments, and they have played an important role in attracting foreign cap- 
ital. In Korea’s case, the won was kept undervalued up to the first half of the 
1980s, and the exchange rate policy clearly played as important a role as taxes 
in promoting export as well as capital inflow. 
Finally, Yun stated in the first part of his paper that Korea has pursued 
internationalization of its capital market since 1981. He did not mention the 
reasons why this policy was being pursued. Foreign investment has always 
been looked at with wariness in Korea, and this attitude has changed very 
slowly. Why is Korea so interested in liberalizing its capital market now? 
What is the impetus for this recent change? Is it driven by internal forces- 
such as the prevalence of excess liquidity-or is Korea yielding to external 
pressure to open its capital market? Are there any preconditions that must be 
achieved before a country can internationalize its capital market? The answer 
to this last question would be useful for other developing countries in deciding 
when they would be in a position to open up their capital market. 
